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EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS-THE DEATH
PENALTY SURVIVES
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia1 the Supreme
Court has attempted to clarify the requirements for death penalty
statutes in order to satisfy the mandates of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court
has both narrowed the spectrum of death-eligible defendants 2 and
given approval to procedures designed to ensure consistency in cap3
ital sentencing.
The severe nature of the death penalty has prompted the Court
to require a high degree of rationality and consistency in capital sentencing. 4 This pattern ofjurisprudence is consistent with the evolving standards of decency in contemporary society. In McCleskey v.
Kemp, 5 however, the Court drifted away from this goal by holding
that Georgia's capital sentencing system was constitutional despite
evidence that it had applied the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner. 6
This Note examines the application of Georgia's capital sentencing system by analyzing the facts, lower decisions, and Supreme
Court opinions in McCleskey v. Kemp. In reviewing the errors in the
majority's opinion, this Note argues that the Court misinterpreted
prior decisions with regard to capital punishment. This Note also
argues that the Court inappropriately relied on various policies to
justify its reasoning. Finally, this Note concludes that the Court un1 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(holding that all of the discretionary death penalty statutes
then in effect violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments," which was made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
2 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
3 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
5 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
6 Id. at 1765.
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dermined important state concerns in maintaining the death
penalty.
II.

FACTS OF MCCLESKEY V.KEMP

A young black male, Warren McCleskey, "was convicted of two
counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in the Superior
Court of Fulton County, Georgia, on October 12, 1978." 7 The evidence at trial showed that McCleskey and three accomplices
planned and completed the robbery of a furniture store.8 During
the robbery, a white police officer, responding to a silent alarm, entered the store.9 As the police officer was walking down the center
aisle of the store, he was struck and killed by two shots.1 0
Several weeks after the robbery, McCleskey was arrested for an
unrelated offense."' After his arrest, McCleskey confessed to the
furniture store robbery, but he denied the shooting of the police
officer. At trial for the events connected with the robbery, the State
introduced evidence that at least one of the bullets that struck the
officer was fired from a gun that matched the description of a gun
McCleskey had carried during the robbery. 12 Furthermore, witnesses testified that they had heard McCleskey admit to the shoot4
ing.' 3 A petit jury convicted McCleskey of murder.'
At the penalty hearing,' 5 the court instructed that the "jury
could not consider imposing the death penalty unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by one
of the statuatory aggravating circumstances," which are circumstances which add to the enormity or injurious consequences of the
crime.' 6 The jury found two aggravating circumstances, 17 and Mc7 Id. at 1761-62.
8 Id. at 1762.

9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 The relevant Georgia statute provides that a person commits murder "when he
unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of
another human being." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(a) (1984).
15 Georgia law provides that when ajury convicts a defendant of murder, "the court
shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury." GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (1982).
16 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1762. A jury cannot sentence a defendant to death for
murder unless it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the following aggravating
circumstances existed:
(1) The offense ... was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for a capital felony;
(2) The offense... was committed while the offender was engaged in the commis-
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Cleskey offered no mitigating evidence. 18 The jury recommended
that McCleskey be sentenced to death for the murder conviction and
to two consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery convictions.19 The trial courtjudge accepted the jury's capital punishment
20
recommendation and imposed the death penalty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the murder
and armed robbery convictions and the sentences. 21 After the
United States Supreme Court denied McCleskey's petition for a writ
of certiorari, 2 2 the Superior Court of Fulton County denied McCleskey's motion for a new trial. 23 Subsequently, the Superior Court of
Butts County denied McCleskey's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. 24 The Supreme Court of Georgia denied McCleskey's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the Butts
County Superior Court's denial of his petition. The United States
sion of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson
in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder ... knowingly created a risk of death to
more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense ... for himself or another, for purpose of
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of ajudicial officer, formerjudicial officer, district attorney or solicitor, or former district attorney or solicitor was committed during or because of
the exercise of his official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind,
or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense . . . was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
(9) The offense ...was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1982).
17 The two aggravating circumstances the jury found are discussed in GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-10-30(b)(2) and 17-10-30(b)(8) (1982). See supra note 16.
18 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
19 Id.

Id. The Georgia Code provides that "[w]here a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982).
21 McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980).
22 McCleskey v. Georgia, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
23 McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
24 McCleskey v. Zant, No. 4909 (Ga. Super. April 8, 1981)(order denying petition for
writ of habeas corpus). Presumably, McCleskey was being jailed in Butts County, allowing him to seek his writ of habeas corpus in Butts County.
20
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Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 25
McCleskey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
26
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
McCleskey's petition included a claim that "the Georgia capital sentencing process ...[had been] administered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution." 27 In support of his claim, Mc28
Cleskey presented statistical research, namely, the Baldus study,
"that purport[ed] to show a disparity in the imposition of the death
penalty in Georgia based on [both] the race of the murder victim,
29
and to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant."
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to consider
McCleskey's petition. Although it found no merit in McCleskey's
eighth amendment claim, 30 it carefully analyzed the Baldus study.
The court held that the Baldus study failed to contribute anything of
3
value to McCleskey's claims and dismissed his petition. '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, heard McCleskey's appeal of the district court's decision.3 2 The Eleventh Circuit assumed the validity of the Baldus
study and addressed the substantive issues presented by McCleskey's eighth and fourteenth amendment claims. 3 3 The appeals court
believed the proffered statistics to be "insufficient to demonstrate
discriminatory intent or unconstitutional discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment context, [and] insufficient to show irrationality,
arbitrariness and capriciousness under any kind of Eighth Amendment analysis." '34 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of McCleskey's claims despite confirming the validity of
the Baldus study.3 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether McCleskey's capital sentence was uncon36
stitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
25 McCleskey v. Zant, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981).
26 McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
27 Id.

28 Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 7 4J. GRIM. L. & C. 661 (1983) [hereinafter Baldus].
29 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
30 See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

976 (1979) (holding that Florida's death penalty statute did not violate defendant's constitutional rights).
31 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
32 McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985).

33 Id. at 895.
34 Id. at 891.
35 Id.
36 McCleskey v. Kemp, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
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THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

A sharply divided Court3 7 affirmed the decision of the Eleventh
Circuit and held that the administration of Georgia's capital punishment system did not violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments.A8 Justice Powell began his opinion by setting the boundaries
of McCleskey's fourteenth amendment claim in which he asserted
"race ha[d] infected the administration of Georgia's statute in two
ways: persons who murder whites are more likely to be sentenced to
death than persons who murder blacks, and black murderers are
more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers." 3 9 Justice Powell noted that McCleskey's claim of discrimination extended
throughout the Georgia capital sentencing process-from jury to
prosecutor to the state legislature that had enacted the statute. 40
Justice Powell then stated that the Court would join the string of
lower courts which had considered this issue 41 and denied McCles42

key relief.

Justice Powell began his analysis with the proposition that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has a two-fold
burden. First, he must prove "the existence of purposeful discrimination,"' 43 and second, he must prove that the purposeful discrimination "had a discriminatory effect" on him. 44 Justice Powell noted
that McCleskey relied solely on the Baldus study to compel an inference that his sentence rested on purposeful discrimination. 4 5 The
majority concluded that if the Baldus study was "sufficient proof of
discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, such
a claim would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where
37 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan filed a dissent which
Justice Marshall joined. Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined all but Part I of Justice
Brennan's dissent. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent whichJustices Marshall and
Stevens joined and, in all but Part IV-B of which, Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent and was joined by Justice Blackmun.
38 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
39 Id. at 1766.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984);
Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443 (11 th Cir. 1983)(per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1063 (1984); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 976 (1979).
42 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1766.
43 Id. (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
44 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
45 Id. at 1766-67.
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the victim was white and the defendant was black." 46
Justice Powell then discussed the Court's use of statistics to
47
demonstrate proof of intent to discriminate in limited contexts.
Justice Powell observed that the two areas in which statistical evidence had been used to prove an equal protection violation were in
the selection of thejury venire and in the showing of statutory violations under Title VII.4 8 Justice Powell asserted that the capital sentencing decision and the relationship of statistics to that decision
were fundamentally different from the corresponding elements in
the venire-selection 49 or Title VII cases. 50 He reasoned that "[i]n
[venire-selection and Title VII] cases, the statistics related to fewer
entities, and fewer variables were relevant to the challenged decisions" than in a capital sentencing case. 5 1 The majority noted that
each capital punishment decision was made "by a petit jury selected
from a properly constituted venire." 5 2 Justice Powell stated further
that each jury is unique in composition and that the Constitution
mandated each jury to rest its decision on several factors that vary
with each individual defendant and case. "Thus, the application of
an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision
in a trial . .. [would not] be comparable to the application of an
inference drawn from general statistics to a specific venire-selection
53
or Title VII case."
Justice Powell discussed another difference between a capital
punishment case and the venire-selection and Title VII cases. In the
two latter contexts, Justice Powell reasoned that the factfinders have
a chance to justify the statistical disparity because these decisionmakers can be questioned about their motivation in decision-making. 54 In McCleskey, however, Justice Powell determined that the
state had no similar opportunity, because jurors cannot be called
" 'to testify to the motives and influences that led to their verdict.' 55 Justice Powell also asserted that similar policy considerations prevented an inquisition into a prosecutor's decision to seek
the death penalty. 5 6 The majority stated that absent strong proof to
Id. at 1767.
Id.
Id.
49 Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
50 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
51 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1768.
52 Id. at 1767.
53 Id. at 1767-68.
54 Id. at 1768.
55 Id. (quoting Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907)).
56 Id.
46
47
48
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the contrary, "it [was] unnecessary to seek such a rebuttal, because a
legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision was apparent from the record: [the defendant] committed an act for which the
United States Constitution and Georgia law permit imposition of
57
the death penalty."
Justice Powell next declared that McCleskey's statistical evidence challenged decisions at the core of Georgia's criminal justice
system. 58 He asserted that implementation of these laws required
crucial discretionary judgments and that exceptionally clear evidence would be demanded to show that discretion had been
abused. 59 The majority stated that the "unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case counsel[ed] against adopting such an inference from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study."' 60 The
majority thus held that the Baldus study was inadequate to compel
an inference that racial prejudice affected the sentence imposed
61
against McCleskey.
Justice Powell then considered McCleskey's contention that the
state as a whole violated the equal protection clause by adopting the
capital punishment statute despite its alleged discriminatory application. 62 The Court dismissed this argument, asserting that "[f]or
this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discrimanatory effect." '63 Justice
Powell stated that the Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia64 demonstrated that the Georgia capital sentencing system could operate in a
fair and neutral manner, especially in the absence of any evidence
"that the Georgia legislature enacted the capital punishment statute
to further a racially discriminatory purpose. ' 65 Justice Powell further reasoned that "McCleskey [had not] demonstrated that the legislature maintained its capital punishment statute because of the
racially disproportionate impact."' 66 The Court refused to infer a
discriminatory purpose from the statute because of its determination that the legislature had legitimate reasons to adopt and main57 Id. at 1769.
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1769-70.
Id. at 1770.

58

63
64
65
66
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tain capital punishment. 6 7
The Court next addressed the petitioner's claim that Georgia's
capital sentencing system was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment. Justice Powell began by analyz68
ing the precedents which set restrictions on capital punishment.
The majority also acknowledged the constitutionality of capital punishment. 69 The Court then discussed how the death penalty must
be based on contemporary standards of decency 7 0 indicated by two
72
sources: decisions of state legislatures 7 1 and decisions ofjuries.
The Court was guided by Furmanv. Georgia73 and Gregg v. Geor7
4
gia in its eighth amendment analysis of Georgia's death penalty
statute. In Furman, the statute at issue provided no basis "for determining in any particular case whether the death penalty imposed
was proportionate to the crime."' 75 Gregg addressed the issue left
open in Furman-whether the death penalty for murder was violative
76
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments under all circumstances.
The Gregg Court noted the long history of acceptance of the death
penalty in both the United States and England. 7 7 In the aftermath
of Furman, thirty-five states re-enacted the death penalty. 78 The
Court in Gregg concluded that the decision of a jury to institute the
death penalty was consistent with the intent of the Georgia
79
legislature.
The Gregg Court upheld the constitutionality of particular proId.
Id. The Court's early eighth amendment cases examined the methods of execution to determine "'whether they were too cruel to pass constitutional muster.'" Id.
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170). See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)(electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)(public shooting). The Court has also acknowledged that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the
offense." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
69 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
70 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771.
71 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
72 Id. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)(felony murder); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)(rape).
73 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
67

68

74 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
75 Furman, 408 U.S. at 313.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 179.
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771. Thirty-seven states now have capital punishment
statutes that have been enacted since the Court decided Furman. Id. at n.23 (citing
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (Oct. 1, 1986)).
Federal law authorizes capital punishment in cases of aircraft piracy if a death results.
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)(1)(b) (1974).
79 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
76
77
78
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cedures embodied in the Georgia punishment statute.8 0 The majority explained that Furman required that in a situation in which
discretion is given to a sentencing body considering the death penalty, that discretion must be limited to minimize the risk of "arbitrary and capricious action." 8' The new Georgia capital punishment
system met the concerns raised in Furman with the following safeguards: the bifurcation of guilt and sentencing proceedings, 2 the
3
narrowing of the class of murders subject to the death penalty,

allowing the defendant to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence,8 4 and the requirement of an inquiry into the circumstances of
the offense along with the propensities of the particular offender.8 5
Thus, Justice Powell reasoned in McCleskey that although discretion
still existed in the Georgia capital sentencing system, this discretion
was effectively limited by objective criteria that avoided
descriminatory application.8 6 The majority asserted that the system's provision for an automatic appeal of a death sentence to the
Georgia Supreme Court, aided by a detailed questionnaire,8 7 added
protection for a defendant because a determination was made as to
whether the sentence was imposed under prejudice.8 8 Furthermore,
the Court concluded that the appeals process also required adequate evidence of whether statutory aggravating circumstances existed and whether the sentence was disproportionate to sentences
imposed in similar murder cases.8 9
The Court observed that further restrictions on capital sentencing decisions had been imposed in cases since Gregg.90 These cases
required the invalidation of a mandatory sentencing system, 9 ' the
"narrow[ing of] the class of murderers subject to capital punish93
ment," 92 and the provision of specific guidelines to the sentencer.
Justice Powell also noted that sentencers were required to consider
any mitigating factors or characteristics of the offense or the
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.

86 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1772.
87 Id. The trial judge answers a questionnaire about the trial, including questions as
to "the quality of the defendant's representation [and] whether race played a role in the
trial."
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.

91 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
92 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
93 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976).

1988]

DEATH PENALTY

1089

defendant. 94
Justice Powell then discussed Godfrey v. Georgia,95 in which the
Court evaluated the application of Georgia's capital sentencing statute in particular cases. 96 According to Justice Powell, the Court in
Godfrey held that Georgia's interpretation of the statute had "vitiated
the role of the aggravating circumstance in guiding the jury's sen97
tencing discretion."
Justice Powell described how objective community standards
had demonstrated a consensus that the death penalty was disproportionately applied to certain classes of cases. 98 He also summarized the constitutional spectrum of discretion a jury has in
imposing the death penalty. 99 First, a required threshold of rational
criteria must be found before the death penalty may be imposed.10 0
Second, states cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant mitigating factor.'10 Justice Powell then asserted that McCleskey's argument was not one of disproportionality in the traditional
sense and that his sentence was proportionate to the crime of
murder.102
Justice Powell rejected the contention that McCleskey's case differed from other cases in which defendants had received the death
penalty.' 0 3 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court had found that
the sentence in McCleskey's case was not disproportionate to other
cases of capital punishment in Georgia.' 0 4 The majority agreed with
this analysis. When sentencing discretion has been adequately controlled, Justice White argued in Pulley v. Harris, such a proportionality review was not even required. 10 5
Justice Powell reasoned that McCleskey could not prove a violation of the eighth amendment by showing that similar defendants
94 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1773 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 588, 604 (1978)(plurality opinion)).
95 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
96 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1773.

97

Id.

Id. See also Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
99 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1774.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984)). McCleskey did "not deny that he
committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a crime for which the Court has
determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be imposed." Id. (citing Gregg,
428 U.S. at 187). McCleskey's argument was that his sentence was disproportionate to
sentences in other murder cases. Id.
103 Id.
104 McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E. 2d 146 (1980).
105 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984).
98
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did not receive the death penalty. 10 6 The majority stated that no
precedent suggested that providing an individual defendant leniency is violative of the Constitution. 10 7 Justice Powell argued that
because McCleskey's sentence was given within Georgia sentencing
procedures that channel discretion with consideration of the individual circumstances of the crime and the defendant, the Court
could presume McCleskey's sentence was not imposed "wantonly
and freakishly" 1 0 8 and therefore violative of the eighth
amendment. 109
Justice Powell then addressed McCleskey's challenge "that the
Georgia capital punishment system . . . [was] arbitrary and capricious in application, and [was] therefore . . . excessive, because racial considerations may influence capital sentencing decisions in
Georgia." 11 0 First, Justice Powell examined the possible interpretations of the Baldus study.11 1 The majority observed that Professor
Baldus did not contend that his study proved race entered into all
capital sentencing decisions, but only that there existed some likelihood that the race factor entered into some capital sentencing decisions. 112 Justice Powell acknowledged a risk that racial prejudice
could influence a jury's decison along with other forms of prejudice.1 13 He believed the proper question was whether this risk was
so great that it was constitutionally impermissible. 1 14 Although McCleskey argued that the Baldus study demonstrated the requisite
likelihood of racial prejudice, the majority declined to follow this
view. 11 5
Justice Powell asserted that the Court, in recognizing the risk
that racial considerations may enter the criminal justice process, has
made continuous efforts to remove racial prejudice from the criminal justice system. 116 Justice Powell stated that the right to trial by
117
jury was both a cornerstone of the whole criminal justice system
and was one of the fundamental protections against racial prejudice.' 18 More specifically, the Court argued that a capital sentenc106 McCleskey,

107 S. Ct. at 1774.

107 Id.
108 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
109 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1775.
110 Id.

III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117
118

Id. at 1776.
Id.
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ing jury had the ability to give an impartial expression of the
community's beliefs on the ultimate question-the death penalty. 19
Justice Powell next noted that each individual juror contributed
a wide variety of experiences to the jury's collective deliberations,
some of which were impossible to ascertain.' 20 Thus, he observed
that some jury decisions were difficult to explain. 12 1 Justice Powell
argued that this inherent lack of predictability did not warrant destruction of the system.' 22 Rather, he reasoned that "the jury's
function was to make . . . the uniquely human judgments that...
[add] 'equity and flexibility to our criminal justice system.'"123
Justice Powell reasoned that McCleskey's argument that the
Constitution condemned the discretionary characteristics of the
Georgia capital sentencing system was "antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal justice system."' 124 Justice
Powell asserted that discretion gave the criminal defendant substantial benefits, including not returning a conviction or imposing a
lesser sentence.' 25 The majority further stated that although decisions against a defendant's interest are reversible, "discretionary exercises of leniency are final and unreviewable."' 126 He then noted
12 7
similar benefits that were derived from prosecutorial discretion.
Justice Powell stated that a capital punishment system that did not
allow for discretionary acts of leniency would be untenable.' 28
Justice Powell believed that "at most the Baldus study indicat[ed] a discrepancy... correlat[ing] with race."' 12 9 Justice Powell
reasoned that although seeming disparities were an inevitable part
of our criminal justice system, the discrepancy indicated by the
Baldus study was not similar to the major systemic defects noted in
Furman.'30 Justice Powell next asserted that there existed no perfect
procedure for deciding in which cases the death penalty should be
imposed.' 3 ' Justice Powell reasserted that even with these imperfections, if the process has been adequately insulated with safeguards to ensure fairness, the discretionary elements would not be
119 Id.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 1777.

122

Id.

123

Id. (quoting H.

124

Id.

125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
10 Id.
13'

at 1777-78.
Id. at 1778.

KLAVEN AND H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY
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removed simply because some results were unexplained. 32 Justice
Powell stated that when considered along with the safeguards that
exist to reduce racial prejudice in the process, the fundamental
value of a jury trial, and the benefits of discretion to the criminal
defendant, the Baldus study had not shown "a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital-sentencing
process."133
Justice Powell concluded his opinion by addressing two final
concerns. First, he reasoned that McCleskey's claim would throw
"principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system" into serious question.' 34 Justice Powell feared that if McCleskey's claim"that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision"-was honored, similar claims would be asserted concerning
other types of punishment. 1 3 5 Furthermore, Justice Powell posited
that McCleskey's claim could be extended to other claims based on
other unexplained discrepancies, such as membership in other racial
groups or gender.13 6 The majority contended that statistical disparities that correlate with race or sex could be applied to a variety of
actors in the criminal justice system. 137 Justice Powell stated that
"[t]he Constitution [did] not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital
38
punishment." 1
Second, Justice Powell believed that McCleskey's arguments
were more appropriate for legislative consideration. 13 9 He stated
that it was neither the duty nor the right of the Court to determine
the appropriate punishments for crimes. 140 The majority observed
that legislatures are better suited to analyze the usefulness of statistical studies in terms of their particular localities.' 4 1 Justice Powell
explained that "the duty of the courts was to determine, on a caseby-case basis, whether the laws were applied consistently with the
Constitution."' 14 2 Justice Powell agreed with the district court and
the court of appeals that in this case the law of Georgia was properly
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.

at 1779.

135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
'39 Id.

140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.

at 1780.

at 1781.
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applied. 14 3
B.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT

Justice Brennan began by reasserting his opinion "that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 14 4 Justice
Brennan then stated that even if he did not hold that position, McCleskey had demonstrated the irrationality in capital sentencing that
has long been condemned in the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence. 14 5 Justice Brennan contended that the majority's reasoning for discounting the evidence presented in the Baldus study
46
could not justify ignoring the force of the study.1
Justice Brennan first emphasized his belief that the Court's assertion that the defendant could not prove the influence of racial
prejudice on the sentencing decision in his case or in any other individual case was not probative in considering the eighth amendment
claim which he raised. 14 7 Justice Brennan believed the proper concern was with the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence,
rather than with proof of an arbitrary sentence in a specific case. 148
Justice Brennan stated that "this emphasis on risk acknowledge[d]
the difficulty of... determining the jury's motivation in a... [particular] case. ... [while it also showed] that [the] concern for arbitrariness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole."' 4 9 Justice
Brennan next analyzed how risk had been the relevant consideration
in cases in which death sentences were struck down as a result of
ambiguous definitions of heinous crimes or in which mandatory
death sentences were imposed. 15 0 Justice Brennan reasoned that
the Court has required a defendant to establish that the system
under which a sentence was rendered posed a significant risk that
impermissable considerations infected the process.' 5 ' Justice Brennan noted that McCleskey presented, for the first time, empirical evidence, rather than mere speculation, to show that the system
143 Id.

144 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); See supra note 37 for alignment ofjustices.
145 Id. at 1782 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1783 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

147 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

151 Id. at 1783-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
427 (1980)).
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actually operated in an unconstitutional manner.1 5 2
Justice Brennan next provided a detailed analysis of the Baldus
study. 15 3 He followed this analysis with a discussion of the forcefulness and accuracy of the multiple-regression analysis, especially the
one used in the Baldus study.' 54 Justice Brennan then stated that in
determining what risk would be acceptable, courts must take into
consideration the complete finality of the death sentence.' 55 Justice
Brennan reasoned that because courts will not convict a defendant
"if the chance of error is simply less likely than not," courts "should
not be willing to take a person's life if the chance that his death
sentence was irrationally imposed is more likely than not."'1 56 Justice
Brennan concluded that racially prejudiced sentencing, because it is
irrational, should be condemned in eighth amendment
jurisprudence.

15 7

Justice Brennan proposed that the Baldus study must be considered in conjunction with the history of the racially biased criminal
justice process in Georgia.' 58 Justice Brennan noted that since colonial times, the criminal law in Georgia differentiated between whites
and blacks. 15 9 Justice Brennan then observed that the Court "had
152 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
153 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1784 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1785-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan, the Court
in Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986), held that:
a multiple-regression analysis need not include every conceivable variable to establish a party's case, as long as it includes those variables that account for the major
factors that are likely to influence decisions. In [McCleskey], Professor Baldus in fact
conducted additional regression analyses in response to criticisms and suggestions
by the District Court, all of which ... confirmed the study's original conclusions.
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1785 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1786 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The Baldus study indicated that, after taking into consideration 230 nonracial factors that could legitimately
influence a sentencer, the jury more likely than not would have spared McCleskey's life
had his victim been black." Id. at 1784 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The study separates:
(1) cases in which the jury exercises virtually no discretion because the strength or
weakness of the aggravating factors usually suggests that only one outcome is appropriate; and (2) cases reflecting an "intermediate" level of aggravation, in which
the jury has considerable discretion in choosing a sentence. McCleskey's case falls
into the intermediate range; in such cases, death is imposed in 34% of the white
victim... [cases] and in 14%o of the black victim... [cases], a difference of 139% in
the rate of imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 1786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
157 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For many years, the criminal law in Georgia "expressly differentiated between crimes committed by and against blacks and whites, distinctions whose lineage traced back to the time of slavery. During the colonial period,
black slaves who killed whites in Georgia, regardless of whether in self-defense or in
defense of another, were automatically executed." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing A.
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invalidated portions of the Georgia capital sentencing system 3
times over the past 15 years." 1 6 0 Justice Brennan observed that at
least one justice in each of these decisions discussed the spectre of
racial prejudice.' 6 ' Justice Brennan next explained that his historical view was not meant to force the state to make amends "for past
trangressions.... but that it would be unrealistic to ignore the influence of history in assessing the implications of McCleskey's evidence.' 6 2 Justice
Brennan found that the majority's
acknowledgement of continued efforts to eradicate racial prejudice
did not show the elimination of the problem, but, rather, its
63
persistence.'
Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he discretion prosecutors and
jurors in the Georgia capital-sentencing system created opportunities" for racial prejudice to infect the system.' 64 Justice Brennan
noted that no guidelines existed in Georgia governing
"prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty," nor were jurors
provided with a "list of aggravating or mitigating factors" or with
instructions as to how to apply them. 16 5 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]he Georgia capital sentencing system... provide[d]
considerable opportunity for racial considerations, however subtle
and unconscious, to influence charging and sentencing
6
decisions."16
Justice Brennan next asserted that the majority misinterpreted
existing eighth amendment precedents. 167 He stated that McCleskey's evidence was an exercise in "moral judgment, not a mechanical statistical analysis."' 6 8 Justice Brennan reiterated that the death
penalty required a high degree of rationality due to its irrevocable
nature. 169 The dissent reasoned that "[a] capital sentencing system
256
(1978)).
160 Id. at 1787 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1788 (Brennan,J., dissenting). See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
163 McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1787 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The cases reflect a variety
of situations in which racial considerations influence criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986)(peremptory challenges); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254 (1986)(selection of the grand jury); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985)(in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967) (selection of the petit jury).
164 McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1788 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1789 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS
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in which race more likely than not play[ed] a role" did not meet the
170
constitutional standard of rationality.
Justice Brennan next analyzed the four reasons cited by the majority for not accepting McCleskey's evidence: "the desirability of
discretion ....the existence of statutory safeguards against abuse of
that discretion, the potential consequences for broader challenges
to criminal sentencing, and an understanding of the contours of the
judicial role." 17 1 Justice Brennan stated that although these concerns required careful deliberation, "they do not justify rejecting ev17 2
idence as convincing as McCleskey . . presented."
Justice Brennan asserted that reliance on race is antithetical to
the very reasons for granting sentencing discretion. 173 "Discretion
is a means, not an ends." Thus, a "[f]ailure to conduct ...an individualized ...inquiry 'treats all ...[defendants] not as unique individualized human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
death penalty.' "174 Justice Brennan asserted that "decisions influenced by race rest, in part, on a categorical assessment of the worth
of human beings according to color" that disregards the individual
qualities of the defendant. 175 He posited that an increased willingness to impose the death sentence on black defendants or a diminished willingness to impose the death penalty in crimes in which
17 6
blacks are victims reflected a devaluation of the lives of blacks.
Justice Brennan next reasoned that if a higher risk that race plays a
role is required before action is taken, the goals of discretion will be
17 7
undermined.
Justice Brennan acknowledged that a presumption existed "that
actors in the criminal justice system exercise their discretion in responsible fashion, [so courts] do not automatically infer that sentencing patterns that do not comport with ideal rationality [are
improper]."' 17 8 Justice Brennan asserted that such a presumption,
however, is rebuttable. 179 He concluded that the majority had imId. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1789-90 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1790 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976)).
175 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that discretion is granted to
treat each defendant as an individual. This goal is undermined when defendants are
treated as indistinguishable members of a class of criminals.
178 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170
171
172
173
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posed a crippling burden of proof on defendants in order to rebut
this presumption and present the need for individualized sentencing
decisions. Justice Brennan stated that the majority had rejected the
most sophisticated capital sentencing analysis ever done and one
which demonstrated that race was a likely factor in sentencing decisions. 180 Thus, Justice Brennan reasoned that a rebuttable presumption had been turned into a conclusive one.18 1
Justice Brennan next considered the Court's assertion that McCleskey's evidence was insufficient in light of the safeguards
82
designed to reduce bias in the system which was upheld in Gregg.1
Although the Gregg Court did not grant permanent approval to the
Georgia sentencing system, it assumed that the safeguards were adequate in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 183 Justice Brennan asserted that the empirical nature of the Baldus study prevented
the Court from relying on the statutory safeguards to reject McCleskey's evidence. 184 Justice Brennan posited that the Baldus study
showed that the effectiveness of these safeguards cited by the major1 85
ity was the very subject at issue.
Justice Brennan next attacked the majority's fear that acceptance of McCleskey's evidence would lead to widespread challenges
throughout the criminal justice 'system.' 86 He proposed that the
prospect that more widespread sentencing abuse in the criminal justice system than McCleskey had shown may have occurred was discouraging but that it did not justify complete abandonment of the
Court's judicial role. 187 Justice Brennan acknowledged that any humanly administrated penalty system would exhibit some imperfection, but the Court, in rejecting McCleskey's evidence, failed to
consider the qualitatively different nature of the death penalty, the
repugnance of racial discrimination, and the unprecedented acuity
Id. at 1790-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986). In Batson, the Court showed that the presumption that peremptory challenges
were exercised in a neutral manner was rebuttable.
182 McCleskay, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan relied on
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976), in which "the Court rejected a facial challenge to the Georgia capital sentencing statute, describing such a challenge as based
'simply an assertion of lack of faith' that the system could operate in a fair manner."
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 226
(White, J., concurring)).
183 MCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180

181
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and strength of the Baldus study.' 8 8
Justice Brennan reiterated the qualitative difference between
the death penalty and other forms of punishment. 8 9 He analyzed
the different interests of the state and the defendant in the death
penalty context, stating that "[t]he marginal benefits accruing to the
state from obtaining the death penalty rather than life imprisonment
are considerably less than the marginal difference to the defendant
between death and life in prison."' 190 As a result of this unique punishment, Justice Brennan reasoned that "the degree of arbitrariness
that may be adequate to render the death penalty 'cruel and unusual' punishment may not be adequate to invalidate lesser penalties."'' l Thus, Justice Brennan determined that the majority's fear
of the complete destruction of our legal system was without a sound
base. 192
Justice Brennan next addressed the majority's fear that the acceptance of McCleskey's claim would render all sentencing invalid
"because... a correlation might be demonstrated between sentencing outcomes and other personal characteristics."' 1 93 Justice Brennan believed that such a worry was inconsequential to a
194
determination of whether punishment was "cruel and unusual."'
Justice Brennan stated that "we have expressed a moral commitment" that race would not be a basis for distributing burdens and
benefits. 95 Thus, Justice Brennan was disturbed by the possibility
that the "decison to impose the death penalty could be influenced
by race.., and evidence that race may play even a modest role in...
[the imposition of] a death sentence should be enough to characterize that sentence as 'cruel and unusual.' "196
Justice Brennan next stated that an irrelevant factor, such as
hair color, at least theoretically, could be associated with sentencing
results, but the evaluation of such evidence must be informed by
both history and experience. 197 Justice Brennan rejected the
Court's fear of the expansive ramifications based upon a holding in
favor of McCleskey because of the outstanding quality of the Baldus
study, an action which he believed would establish a "stringent stan188

Id. at 1792 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

189 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

190 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
197 Id. at 1792-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

1
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98 Justice Brennan concluded that dedard for statistical evidence." 1
spite the Court's acceptance of the validity of McCleskey's evidence,
it was willing to let the death sentence stand because of a baseless
fear that the Court could not successfully establish standards for
lesser crimes. 199
Justice Brennan finally considered the majority's worry that the
Court was usurping the legislatures' role in constructing and controlling capital punishment.2 0 0 After acknowledging the importance
of a sparing use of constitutional intervention, 20 ' Justice Brennan
stated that capital punishment is the most powerful act a state can
perform and, therefore, deserves close scrutiny. 20 2 Justice Brennan
posited that this objective must be upheld even when considering
those individuals "society finds most . . . opprobrious. ' 20 3 Justice
Brennan asserted that the courts' duty was to protect such individuals in order to prevent the majoritarian view from trampling over
constitutional protections and to fulfill the goal of the effective sepa20 4
ration of powers.
Justice Brennan concluded his dissent in McCleskey by discussing
the historical efforts of the Court to eradicate racial prejudice from
society.2 0 5 He declared that the rejection of McCleskey's evidence
sent a disturbing message to a society that had formally repudiated

racism.
C.

2 06

JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT

Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent to address McCleskey's fourteenth amendment claim. 20 7 Justice Blackmun first remarked "that racial discrimination is fundamentally at odds with our
constitutional guarantee of equal protection." 20 8 Justice Blackmun
next noted that the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment
revealed that discriminatory enforcement of a state's criminal laws
20 9
was a matter of concern for the drafters of the amendment.
198 Id. at 1793 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1794 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936).
205 McClkskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1794. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1794-95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 37.
208 McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1795 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun also emphasized the qualitatively different nature of the death penalty and other forms of punishment.2 10 He
was disturbed that instead of applying a more stringent standard for
scrutiny of capital punishment, the Court had applied "a lesser stan2 11
dard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."
Justice Blackmun believed the majority's assertion-that because McCleskey was convicted of murder, his fourteenth amendment claim was weakened-was inconsistent with the Court's
precedents. 2 12 Justice Blackmun noted that the invalidation of a
criminal conviction on constitutional grounds does not necessarily
preclude retrial and resentencing by the state. 2 13 Thus, Justice
Blackmun argued that invalidation would be applicable with the per
se reversal rule in cases involving racial discrimination. 2 14 Therefore, a conviction does not suggest that discrimination did not im2 15
permissibly enter the capital sentencing process.
Justice Blackmun proposed that the majority's "reliance on legitimate interests underlying the Georgia legislature's enactment of
its capital punishment statute was inappropriate."2 1 6 He stated that
such considerations were relevant if the case involved a facial challenge to a statute but were irrelevant in a consideration of how the
21 7
statute had been applied.
Justice Blackmun stated that "[i]n analyzing an equal protection
claim, a court must first determine the nature of the claim and the
responsibilities of the state actors involved to determine what showing is required for the establishment of a prima facie case." 2 18 He
asserted that "[t]he Court treat[ed] the case as if it [were] limited to
challenges to the actions of two specific decision-making bodiesthe petit jury and the state legislature," a restriction which allowed
the Court to distinguish McCleskey's case from other cases in which
statistical evidence provided a framework for review.2 19 Justice
Blackmun contended that McCleskey's case did fit into this framework. He also focused on the decisions that were made by the prosId. at 1796 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
211 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
212 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1978);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967).
213 McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1796 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 1796-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 1797 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210
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ecutor, who is the primary actor in a state criminal proceeding. 22 0
Justice Blackmun stated that this post-conviction decision-making
period was a juncture in the proceeding in which the evidence of
racial factors was especially strong.2 2 1 Justice Blackmun noted that
"a criminal defendant alleging an equal protection violation must
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." 22 2 Justice Blackmun believed that once a defendant established a prima facie case,
2 23
the burden shifted to the prosecution to rebut that case.
Justice Blackmun next argued that McCleskey met the threeprong test for establishing a prima facie case set out in Casteneda v.
Partida:22 4 the defendant must show that he was a member of a distinct group singled out for differential treatment; he must show "a
substantial degree of differential treatment"; and he must show that
"the allegedly discriminatory procedure is susceptible to abuse or is
'22 5
not racially neutral.
Justice Blackmun asserted that McCleskey easily met the requirements of the first prong of the test because "[t]he Baldus study
demonstrated that black persons are a distinct group that are singled out for differential treatment in the Georgia capital sentencing
system. ' 22 6 Justice Blackmun noted not only that cases involving a
white victim, regardless of the race of the offender, lead to more
death penalties, but also that black defendants were more likely than
2 27
white defendants to receive the death penalty.
Under the second prong of the test, Justice Blackmun addressed the question of when the risk of race-based differential
treatment becomes constitutionally unacceptable. 22 8 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Baldus study showed systematic disparities in the infliction of the death penalty based on the race of the
victim and the defendant, even after allowing for the presence of
other factors that may affect capital punishment decisions.2 2 9 Jus220 Id. at 1798 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

221 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun refers to evidence indicating prosecutors disproportionately seek the penalty phase for black defendants. Transcript of
Federal Habeas Corpus Hearing 894-926.
222 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
223 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

224 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). This test was also discussed in Batson v. Kentucky, 106
S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
225 MCieskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798-99 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).

226 Id. at 1799 (Blackmun,

J., dissenting).

227 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 1799-800 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). McCleskey established that because he
was charged with killing a white person, he was 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to
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tice Blackmun declared that:
[t]he most persuasive evidence of the constitutionally significant effect
of racial factors in the Georgia capital-sentencing system was McCleskey's proof that the race of the victim was more important in explaining the imposition of a death sentence than the factor
of whether the
2 30
defendant was a "prime mover" in the homicide.
Similarly, the race-of-the-victim factor is nearly as crucial as the statutory aggravating circumstance, whether the defendant had a prior
231
record of a conviction for a capital crime.
Justice Blackmun next examined the evidence in McCleskey's
case, focusing on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty. He argued "that McCleskey established that the race of the
victim is an especially significant factor at the point where the defendant has been convicted of murder.
...
232 At this point in the
process, "the prosecutor must choose whether to proceed to the
penalty phase of the trial and create the possibility that a death sentence may be imposed or to accept the imposition of a sentence of
life imprisonment." 23 3 Justice Blackmun found the evidence
presented by the defendant to be statistically significant to show that
2 34
racial factors had an adverse effect.
Justice Blackmun posited that McCleskey had fulfilled the third
and final prong of the Casteneda test by showing the susceptibility to
abuse of the process by which the state decided both to seek a death
penalty in his case and pursue that sentence throughout the prosecution. 23 5 Justice Blackmun observed that the assistant district attorneys were given no guidelines as to how to proceed at any
particular stage of the prosecution. 2 36 Justice Blackmun also observed the absence of guidelines to suggest when to "seek an indictment for murder as opposed to a lesser charges," when to accept a
plea bargain, and when to seek the death penalty. 23 7 Justice Black-

mun stressed that all of these decisions were left to the complete
death as he would have been had he been charged with killing a black person. Id. at
1800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Baldus, supra note 28, at 707-09.
230 Id. at 1800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
231 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
233 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The state-wide statistics indicated that black defendant/white victim cases advanced to the penalty trial at nearly five times the rate of
the black defendant/black victim cases (70% v. 15%), and over three times the rate of
white defendant/black victim cases (70% v. 19%)." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
Baldus, supra note 28, at 707-09.
234 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1801 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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discretion of the assistant district attorneys, who, in turn, informed
23 8
the district attorney of their decisions.
Justice Blackmun declared that this evidence demonstrated that
at every stage the assistant district attorney exercised a great deal of
discretion. 23 9 He observed that the sole effort to obtain consistency
in the decision to seek the death penalty consisted of the district
attorney's periodic pulling of files to check on the progress of
cases. 240 The assistant district attorneys were not required to report
why they decided whether to seek the death penalty. 241 Justice
Blackmun discussed several factors that the district attorney thought
relevant to the decision to seek the death penalty24 2 and also noted
that the death penalty was not sought in every case in which statutory aggravating circumstances existed. 24 3 Justice Blackmun observed that the district attorney testified "that his office still
operated in the same manner as it did when he took office in 1964,
except that it... [no longer] sought the death penalty in... rape
24 4
cases."
Justice Blackmun reasserted the effect of the history of racial
discrimination in Georgia. 24 5 The evidence from the Baldus study,
considered in conjunction with the evidence presented by Justice
Brennan, was sufficient to show "an inference of discriminatory purpose. ' 24 6 Thus, without evidence to the contrary, Justice Blackmun
presumed that racial factors entered into the decisionmaking process, and the burden, therefore, shifted to the state to show that
racially neutral criteria and procedures yielded the seemingly ra247
cially influenced result.
Justice Blackmun considered the state's proposition "that if the
Baldus thesis was correct then the aggravation level in black-victim
cases where a life sentence was imposed would be higher than in
white-victim cases." '2 48 Justice Blackmun disputed this theory because "[t]he State did not test its hypothesis to determine if white238 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 1802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The factors listed by the district attorney
included the strength of the evidence, the atrociousness of the crime, and the likelihood
that a jury would impose the death sentence.
243 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See Goker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding
that the death penalty was unconstitutonal for the crime of rape).
245 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id. at 1787-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 1802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
248 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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victim and black-victim cases at the same level of aggravating circustances were similarly treated"-a test McCleskey's experts performed. 2 49 Justice Blackmun argued that McCleskey's experts
"demonstrated that the racial disparities in the [capital punishment]
system were not the result of differences in the average aggravation
levels between white-victim and black-victim cases."' 250 In sum, Justice Blackmun stressed that McCleskey had demonstrated an acute
251
trend of differential treatment due to race.
Justice Blackmun also disputed the majority's reasoning for not
applying this analysis to McCleskey.252 He disagreed with the Court's
analysis on the differences between this case and the venire-selection or Title VII cases. 25 3 Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that it would be difficult to examine the juries' decision-making
process because such an examination would create "an inherent
tension between the discretion accorded capital-sentencing juries
and the guidance for use of that discretion that is constitutionally
required." 2 54 Justice Blackmun examined Imbler v. Pachtman,2 55 in
which the Court refused to require that the prosecutor provide an
explanation for his actions in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution. 2 56 However, he stated that Imbler did not stand for the
proposition that prosecutors could not be called upon to answer for
their actions. 25 7 Justice Blackmun asserted that although prosecutors undoubtedly need adequate discretion to perform their duties,
their decisions are not beyond the constraints imposed on state ac25 8
tion under the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Blackmun also discussed the Court's view that this case
was distinguishable from Batston v. Kentucky. 25 9 He believed McCleskey satisfied even the standard of Swain v. Alabama 260 "a standard
that was described in Batson as having placed on defendants a 'crip249
250
251
252
253
254

Id. at 1802-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1803 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1803-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

255 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
258 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986)
(reaffirming that a prosecutor's actions are not unreviewable).
260 380 U.S. 202 (1965)(holding that a black defendant could make out a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system as a
whole was being abused).
256
257
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pling burden of proof.' "261
Justice Blackmun considered the Court's proposition that McCleskey's case could lead to other constitutional challenges.2 6 2 He
found this an insufficient reason to deny McCleskey his rights under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 6 3 Justice
Blackmun asserted that if this case did, in fact, lead to closer scrutiny of the entire system, then society as a whole could possibly
benefit.2 6 4
Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by agreeing with Justice Stevens that the acceptance of McCleskey's claim would not
eliminate capital punishment in Georgia.2 6 5 Justice Blackmun suggested that the establishment of guidelines for prosecutors as to an
appropriate basis for exercising their discretion would provide a
measure of consistency in the process. 2 66
D.

JUSTICE STEVENS'

DISSENT

Justice Stevens also asserted the qualitatively different nature of
the death penalty and the necessity that its use be based on reason,
rather than caprice or emotion.2 67 He agreed that the Baldus study
indicated that the racial considerations were working at a constitu2 68
tionally intolerable level.
Justice Stevens stated the Court's fear that the acceptance of
McCleskey's claim would remove the death penalty in Georgia was
incorrect.2 6 9 If a choice had to be made between a discriminatory
death penalty and no death penalty at all, the choice would be
clear.2 70 Justice Stevens declared that the Baldus study exposed a
category of extremely serious crimes, such as crimes involving multiple aggravating circumstances, in which the death penalty was imposed without regard to the race of the victim or race of the
offender.2 7 1 He believed that restructuring the system to reduce the
class of death-eligible defendants would significantly lessen the
261 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Batson, 106 S. Ct.
at 1720).

262 Id. at 1805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).

266 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 1805-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 37.

268 Id. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

270 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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chance of a discriminatory imposition of the death penalty. 27 2 Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by stating "that further proceedings [would be] necessary in order to determine whether
'273
McCleskey's sentence should be set aside.
IV.

ANALYSIS

During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has struggled
with the task of determining constitutional requirements for the imposition of the ultimate sanction in our criminal justice system-the
death penalty. After recognizing the arbitrary character of various
death penalty statutes, 274 the Court has attempted to reduce the
quantity of death-eligible defendants 2 75 and has established standards to control the discretionary aspects of capital sentencing 2by
76
removing the possibility of arbitrary and capricious application.
Unfortunately, these capital punishment limitations have not proven
to be as effective in practice as in theory.
In McCleskey, the Court was presented with unparalleled statistical evidence that the death penalty in Georgia was being applied in a
racially influenced manner. 2 77 Yet, the Court turned its back on this
evidence and on the history of racial bias in Georgia. Instead, it
found that the Georgia capital punishment system was operating in
a constitutional manner. In doing so, the Court placed a crippling
burden of proof upon defendants that counters the Court's own jurisprudence. 2 78 Instead of giving direction to the state legislatures
on how to more effectively filter the discretionary aspects of capital
sentencing, the Court has not only further entrenched a process that
is constitutionally impermissible, but has also defeated some of the
major purposes behind states' continued support of the death
penalty.
A.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE BALDUS STUDY

The quality of the Baldus study hinges upon its multiple regres272 Id. (Stevens. J., dissenting).
273 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
275 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding death penalty unconstitutional
for crime of rape); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding automatic
death penalty unconstitutional).
276 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that Georgia's definition of
aggravating circumstances were too vague to comply with constitutional requirements);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that Georgia's sentencing system met
constitutional requirements).
277 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986).
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sion analysis. A multiple regression analysis is a procedure that
makes precise and quantitative estimates of the effects of different
factors on some variable of interest. 279 A researcher first identifies
the major variables, such as race, that are believed to influence the
dependent variable, here, the rate of death sentencing. 28 0 The connection between the dependent variables and the independent variable of interest is then estimated by removing the effects of the
other major variables. 28 ' When this analysis is completed, a precise
28 2
estimate of the effects of the variables can be made.
Within this general framework, Professor Baldus and his team
of researchers performed an exhaustive multiple regression analysis. The study's data sample examined over 2000 murder cases" that
occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. 2 3 Professor Baldus analyzed "230 variables that could have explained the disparities on
nonracial grounds." 28 4 Thus, the results of such a study are very
likely to be an accurate indicator of the effect of race on capital
sentencing.
The results of the Baldus study can be described as nothing less
than alarming. 28 5 The most disturbing fact revealed by the study is
that "defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as
likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks." 28 6 Perhaps even more striking, the Baldus study showed
that prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70% of the black defendants who are convicted of killing white victims, and only 19% of the
2 87
white defendants who are convicted of killing black victims.
These statistical facts make Justice Powell's inability to find a constitutional violation even more disconcerting.
Justice Powell dispensed with the pattern of racial discrimination indicated by the Baldus study with the following reasoning:
279 Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 702, 704 (1980).

There are other minor influences which combine to form a non-negligible effect; these
influences are placed in what is called a random disturbance term. It is then assumed
that the joint effect of the minor influences is not systematically related to the effects of
the major influences being investigated; effects of the influences are treated as being due
to chance. Multiple regression thus provides a means not only for extracting the systematic effects from the data sample but also for assessing how well one has succeeded in
the presence of the remaining random effects. Id. at 705-06.
280 Id. at 705-06.
281 Id. at 706.
282 Id.
283 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
284 Id. at 1764.
285 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
286 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1764.
287 Id. at 1785 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of the
criminal justice system. The discrepancy indicated by the Baldus
study is 'a far cry from the major systemic defects identified in
Furman.' "288 Such reasoning is deficient in two respects. First, it
ignores prior jurisprudence, in which statistics were used to show
patterns from which the Court inferred a constitutional violation.
Second, it misses the proper focus of eighth amendment jurisprudence in this context, namely, the risk of arbitrariness in the application of punishment.
The majority opinion used the Baldus study in a curious manner. Although the Court assumed the validity of the study, it disregarded the very results the study yielded. 2 89 The fact that the
validity of the study was assumed is not curious because the Baldus
study is the most accurate and comprehensive statistical analysis of
capital punishment ever completed. Thus, the "discrepancy that appears to correlate with race" 2 90 should not have been so easily
passed over by the Court.
Statistics from a multiple regression analysis indicate patterns
in the aggregate of a data sample. Thus, the Baldus study cannot
prove, with absolute certainty, the intent of an individual to discriminate. This problem is compounded by the discretionary aspects of
the capital sentencing process. Nevertheless, the Court has previously accepted statistics to establish constitutional violations in
other forms, specifically, in the selection of the jury venire 2 9 1 and to
prove a Title VII violation. 2 92 In both instances, a common sense
analysis prevailed and a stark discriminatory pattern was recognized.
In a case in which both contemporary and historical evidence existed, the Court held the statistics sufficient to imply discriminatory
intent. 293 No direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as direct
testimony, was provided by the statistics in Arlington Heights and
Bazemore. A similar situation existed in McCleskey: a strong statistical
pattern existed, but direct testimony was absent from the record.
Justice Powell's attempt to distinguish McCleskey from the jury
venire selection and Title VII cases is unconvincing. 29 4 Justice Powell stated that these other cases "relate to fewer entities, and fewer
Id. at 1777 (footnote omitted)(quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)).
Justice Powell stated that the assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid
did not include the assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually
entered into any sentencing decisions in Georgia. Id. at 1775.
290 Id. at 1777.
291 Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
292 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
293 Id. See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268-7 1.
294 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1767-68.
288
289

1988]

DEATH PENALTY

1109

variables are relevant to the challenged decisions." 2 95 The exhaustive quality of the Baldus study eliminates this worry. Professor
Baldus took so many variables into account that the pattern of discrimination his study indicates is, in reality, even more oppressive.
With an effective regresssion analysis, the fact that more variables
exist does not automatically render the study any less accurate.
Justice Powell argued that in McCleskey the state had no opportunity to explain the statistical disparity, while in the jury venire and
Tide VII cases, such an opportunity existed. 2 96 True enough, procedural safeguards are necessary to protect the integrity of jurors
and other decisionmakers in the capital sentencing process.2 97 Yet,
such procedural safeguards should not be used to remove the constitutional rights of a more significant actor in the system: the defendant. A defendant, such as McCleskey, should not have to suffer
the penalty of death because of other functional infirmities in the
criminal justice system.
Justice Powell's analysis seems generally counterintuitive. The
majority employs stricter standards to show discrimination in the
capital punishment system than to show discrimination in jury venire or Title VII cases. It must be reiterated that death is a graver
punishment, so superior safeguards are necessary to insure an evenhanded application of the death penalty. Justice Powell, however,
dismissed evidence which indicated that this goal was not being
98
satisfied.2
B.

THE RISK OF ARBrTRARINESS AND THE LEGACY OF FURMAN

A second major error injustice Powell's reasoning is that it fails
to recognize the proper focus of the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence. The eighth amendment requires an examination of
the risk that a death penalty was arbitrarily and capriciously imposed.2 9 9 Justice Brennan's eloquent dissent accurately maps out
how the Court, since Furman, has consistently focused on the risk
that a death sentence was arbitrarily imposed.3 0 0 "[T]hat the death
penalty 'may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner' "1 is a succinct and completely accurate
295 Id. at 1768.
296 Id.
297 Id.

298
299
300
301

Id. at 1777-78. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1783 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427).
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statement of what precedent requires the focus to be in analyzing
the McCleskey evidence. This method of analysis has been consistently affirmed.3 0 2 Thus,Justice Powell's insistence that the evidence
should prove the invalidity of individual sentences is inappropriate
and establishes a virtually impossible burden of proof for the
defendant.
The only way to get better results than those provided by the
Baldus study would be to ask the discretionary actors within the capital sentencing infrastructure whether they had discriminated in a
particular case. Unfortunately, the possibility of getting this information is highly improbable. First, such an admission would be extremely unlikely, even if the actor knew he had consciously
discriminated. Second, subconscious discrimination would definitely not be discovered, because by definition the actor would be
unaware of his discriminatory tendencies. Third, such an admission
would be precluded because the discretionary actors cannot be
asked about these influences. Attempts to show discrimination
through testimony are effectively foreclosed, and empirical evidence
is effectively disregarded. Thus, defendants are precluded from asserting any viable claim that an arbitrary sentence has been handed
out.
Upon closer inspection, it appears that Justice Powell is aware
that the risk of racial discrimination is a crucial factor in eighth
amendment analysis. Justice Powell acknowledged the risk of racial
prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case. 30 3 He
quoted from Turner v. Murray :304 "the question is at what point that
risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable. ' 30 5 Such an acknowledgement is surprising considering Justice Powell's focus on individual sentencing. Thus, Justice Powell does not question the
empirical results of the Baldus study, yet, because they are unsatisfactory to establish a constitutional violation, the Court has effectively established an insurmountable burden of proof.
Furman and its progeny presented a pattern which should have
302 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) ("constitutionally impermissable to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has
been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere"); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976)
(mandatory death sentences held invalid for same reasons expressed in Woodson); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
303 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1775.
304 90 L. Ed. 27, 37 (1986)(holding that a "defendant accused of an interacial crime is
entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the victim's race and questioned on the

issue of racial bias").
305 Id. at 45.
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been followed by the Court, but unfortunately was not. In 1971, the
Court in McGautha v. Californiareviewed the procedures used by the
states to administer their death penalty statutes and gave those statutes constitutional approval.3 0 6 Only one year later, Furman struck
down these statutes,3 0 7 finding that they were unconstitutional in
their application.3 0 8 Furman thus reaffirmed a critical principle:
statutes, although neutral and fair on their face, must still demonstrate, in practice, that fair and nonarbitrary death sentences are
handed down by the capital punishment systems in order for those
systems or sentences to be deemed constitutionally acceptable.3 0 9
Although a situation was presented in which the Court could
have applied the Furman standard, the McCleshey Court failed to follow the Furman Court's lead. According to Justice Brennan, the
Gregg Court stamped the various states' death penalty statutes as being valid on their face.3 10 As noted by Justice Brennan, "Gregg bestowed no permanent approval on Georgia's capital punishment
system,"just approval in the absence of contrary evidence. 31' Once
again, the Court has been presented with evidence that a death penalty statute is still constitutionally unacceptable in its application.
The Court, however, broke from the analogous situations of McGautha and Furman and ruled that the Georgia statute is constitutional in application. The Court finally had contrary evidence, but it
failed to employ that evidence although precedents warranted its
use. The reasons given for this break with precedents do not attack
the evidence presented by McCleskey. Instead, the Court simply offered policy reasons for ignoring the results of the Baldus study.
This sort of analysis is inadequate to protect the rights of McCleskey
and other prisoners on death row in Georgia.
Justice Brennan noted the four policy reasons cited by the
Court for not yielding to "the implications of McCleskey's evidence:
the desirability of discretion for actors in the criminal justice system,
the existence of statutory safeguards against abuse of that discretion, the potential consequences for broader challenges to criminal
sentencing, and an understanding of the contours of the judicial
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id.
309 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976)(the Texas capital sentencing system's requirement of a finding of statutory aggravating circumstance was held valid for the same reasons expressed in Gregg); Proffit v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (a capital sentencing system where trial judges make sentencing determinations was constitutional for the same reasons noted in Gregg).
310 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
311 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
306
307
308
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role.13 1 2 These are, perhaps, sound policy reasons for establishing
the facial validity of a capital punishment statute. Yet, these reasons
are not strong enough to overcome the mandates of the Constitution under the eighth amendment. Justice Brennan correctly recognized that the Baldus study calls these same safeguards into
question.
Justice Brennan gave a fine substantive analysis of why the
Court defeated the very policies it purported to promote. In general, when presented with empirical results that some aspect of our
criminal justice system is discriminatory, the Court is required to
take whatever steps are necessary to eradicate this evil from the system. Instead of addressing this task, the Court relied on conclusory
policy arguments which do not go to the substantive claim, namely,
that arbitrary capital sentencing exists at the expense of the rights of
defendants such as Warren McCleskey.
C.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Justice Blackmun's artful opinion demonstrated that the Georgia capital sentencing also violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 31 3 Justice Blackmun accurately showed that
McCleskey has fulfilled the three-prong requirements of Batson v.
Kentucky3 14 and Castaneda v. Partida.3 1 5 The policy reasons selected
by the McCleskey Court are insufficient to ignore the evidence that an
equal protection violation has occurred. An individual should not
be deprived of his constitutional rights even though safeguards exist
to protect the integrity of the process, if, in fact, these safeguards
are ineffective. The Court's reasoning is contrary to the guarantees
of the Constitution and, therefore, is incongruent with the goals of
American society.
D.

THE DEATH KNELL OF THE DEATH PENALTY?

As noted by Justice Stevens, the majority's decision appears in
part based on a fear that the acceptance of McCleskey's claim would
lead to the destruction of the death penalty in Georgia. 31 6 The
Baldus study shows that this worry is inappropriate. There exists a
group of crimes for which the death penalty is consistently imposed
without regard to the race of the victim or defendant.3 17 Defend312 Id at 1789-90 (Brennan,

J., dissenting).

313 Id. at 1795 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).

314 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
315 430 U.S. 582 (1977).
316 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ants who commit murders of an extremely heinous nature are consistently given the death penalty. The Baldus study indicates that in
a sample which includes all defendants convicted of murder, death
sentences are rendered at a rate of over 50% in which more than
three statutory aggravating circumstances are present.3 18 A similar
result is shown by examining the rate at which cases proceed to a
penalty trial. In cases which three or more aggravating factors are
present, the cases advance to a penalty trial at a rate of at least
50%.3' m Of the cases that do advance to a penalty trial, namely
those cases in which four or more aggravating factors exist, death
sentences are handed down at a rate of at least 77%.320 If the heinousness of the crime is measured by the aggravation level, these
patterns indicate that heinous murders lead to high death sentencing rates.
One method to alter the racially discriminatory patterns shown
by the Baldus study would be to limit death sentencing to those
cases in which multiple aggravating circumstances are present.
Such a plan could be implemented without removing the discretionary aspects of death sentencing. Currently, all cases that involve
multiple aggravating circumstances do not result in the giving of
death sentences. This plan would limit the class of death-eligible
defendants to those that society has already shown they feel are
most opprobrious, regardless of the race of the defendant or the
victim.
This proposal still leaves the opportunity for racial discrimination to operate. Yet, the Baldus study shows that race is less of a
factor in high aggravation cases. The Court remarked in Singer v.
United States 32 1 that constitutional guarantees are met when "the
mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible. ' '3 22 This plan
would guard against racial prejudice in the system because blacks
would stand a lesser chance of receiving differential treatment. To
eliminate the death penalty entirely would be inappropriate because
the states have shown they want the death penalty to exist.3 23 Still,
the statutes must satisfy constitutional requirements. Further limiting of the class of death eligible defendants would satisfy the inter318 Baldus, supra note 28, at 700.

Id. at 706.
320 Id. at 707.
321 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)("a defendant's only constitutional right concerning the
319

method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury").
322 Id. at 35.
323 See supra note 78.
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ests of the states while also going further to fulfill the requirements
of the Constitution.
E.

MCCLESKEY'S NEGATIVE EFFECT ON DETERRENCE AND RETRIBUTION

Two goals often cited as reasons for the retention of capital
punishment are deterrence of future murders and retribution for
the ultimate wrong of taking another person's life. 324 Both of these
justifications are subject to considerable debate. Empirical studies
have not determined with any degree of certainty whether the death
penalty deters more murders than does a lesser sentence. 325 Justice
Stewart summed up this view stating that:
[a]lthough some . . . studies suggest that the death penalty may not
function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there
is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this
view....

[W]e do not know, and for systematic and visible reasons

cannot know what the truth about this "deterrent" effect may be....
A "scientific"-that is to say, a soundly based-conclusion is simply
impossible,
and no methodological path out [of] this tangle suggests
3 26
itself.

The retribution goal also is the subject of much disagreement.
First, whether or not revenge should be considered in our punishment system is an issue of much debate. 32 7 Second, whether retribution goals can possibly be met due to the fact that the death
penalty is applied relatively infrequently is another point of
3 28
contention.
These two enumerated gray areas have important implications
when considered in tandem with the results of the Baldus study.
Since the deterrent and retributive effects of capital punishment are
unclear, particular care should be taken in its application. The
Baldus study indicates that this care has not been exercised to the
greatest extent possible. 3 29 Even if one assumes that capital punishment does have substantive deterrent effects, the Baldus study
shows that capital punishment will have a lesser deterrent effect on
certain prospective murderers, most significantly, white murderers
with black victims, because these criminals are the least likely to re324 For collections of opposing views

on the deterrent effects of the death penalty,

compare D.

BENDER AND B. LEONE, THE DEATH PENALTY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (1985);
B. NAKELL AND K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987); T. SELLIN,
THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980).
325 See T. SELLIN, supra note 324, at 35-53.

326
327
328
329

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976).
T. Sellin, supra note 324, at 35-53.
Id.
Baldus, supra note 28, at 728.
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ceive the death penalty. Finally, a similar result should be realized
for the retribution goal because black victims will not receive the
same rate of retribution for their lost lives as white victims. 330 Overall, the Baldus study indicates that the current capital sentencing
system in Georgia presents a devaluation of black lives that is
intolerable.
The uniqueness of the death penalty should require superior
rationality in its application; "the qualitative difference of death
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." 33 1 This
view is strengthened by the uncertain effects of capital punishment.
It seems logical that a force with uncertain effects should be employed in as predictable a fashion as possible or else not used at all.
The Court's ruling in McCleskey, however, shies away from this ideal.
The Court's decision allows less rationality while at the same time
sanctioning a negative form of predictability at the expense of black
lives-both victims and defendants. These factors should lead to
tighter restrictions; unfortunately, the Court allows the perpetuation of a system that is highly unpredictable.
The deterrent effects of the death penalty, assuming that they
exist, are also obviated. Georgia has demonstrated a very low death
sentencing rate in black victim cases. 3 32 The Baldus study shows the
rate is 6% in black victim cases compared with 24% in white victim
cases. 3 3 3 The study also notes that this inequity is particularly prevalent when prosecutors are deciding whether to seek a death sentence. Furthermore, the disparity persists after adjustment for the
aggravation level of different cases. 3 3 4 Georgia juries and prosecutors appear to tolerate greater levels of aggravation without imposing the death penalty in black victim cases as compared with white
victim cases. 3 35 Thus, the black community is not receiving the
same protection against murder that the white community is receiving. Equal protection of the laws is therefore unfulfilled. This fact
is particularly disturbing when one considers the proportion of
black victim murders in the entire Baldus study sample and the proportion of blacks in the total population in Georgia. 3 36 The black
community is overrepresented in the low income strata, making it
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

Id.
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)(footnote omitted).
Baldus, supra note 28, at 708-09.
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Baldus, supra note 28, at 708-09.
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especially prone to the violence that often accompanies impoverishment. It would seem that more deterrent factors should be concentrated on the black community, regardless of the race of the
defendant. However, the opposite result obtains. This devaluation
of black lives is at odds with the ideals of American society and
should be eliminated.
A similar argument can be made with regard to the retributive
effects of the death penalty. If the purpose of the death penalty is to
give society revenge for the ultimate wrong, the Baldus study indi3 37 If
cates that this goal is unsatisfied when blacks are murdered.
retribution is a legitimate goal-an ideal to which the states seem to
adhere-then the uneven application of capital punishment yields
uneven retribution for those families whose lives are altered by the
loss of one of its members. The devaluation of black lives is again
the end result. With the existence of such a pattern, the equal protection mandated by the fourteenth amendment is a hollow aspiration for black Americans.
F.

DISCRIMINATION AND PROSECUTOR DISCRETION

Prosecutorial discretion is perhaps the most important discretionary element in the Georgia capital sentencing system. The prosecutor controls the type of conviction sought. The prosecutor also
controls the plea bargaining process and the dismissals of cases at
the postindictment-preconviction stage. 33s Most significantly, the
prosecutor decides whether a trial proceeds to the penalty phase. 3 39
This unbridled discretion provides ample opportunity for discrimination to operate.
Racial bias can infect the prosecutor's decisionmaking in two
possible ways. First, the prosecutor himself may be biased. This
could influence a prosecutor to attempt not only to vindicate the
lives of white victims more quickly than those of black victims, but
also to punish black defendants more severely than white defendants. Second, a prosecutor may determine that juries discriminate
on a racial basis. In turn, this knowledge could affect the rate and
circumstances in which a prosecutor seeks the death penalty; the
prosecutor would seek the death penalty more often in white victim
and black defendant cases heard by a jury because of a greater
chance of success due to the biases of the jury. Either situation is
unacceptable under the rubric of the Constitution. Unless changes
337 Id. at 708-09.

338 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1801 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
339 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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are made, the system depicted by the Baldus study will retain discretionary aspects that allow the influence of racial bias.
Changes could be easily implemented to lessen the chance of
prosecutor bias. Narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants is
one method. 340 Another possible change would be to establish
guidelines for the actors in the district attorney's office to ensure
more consistency in the decision to seek the death penalty. Currently, no guidelines exist to channel the discretion wielded by prosecutors. 3 4 1 Such guidelines would not completely remove the
discretion demanded by prosecutors. However, they would provide
incentive for regular, thoughtful decisions which would make scrutiny easier. This change would not constitute a major inconvenience, and it would further the goal of making the system as fair as
possible by limiting the opportunities for abuse.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE PROPER PARAMETERS OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE

The Court argues that McCleskey's arguments should best be
presented to the various state legislatures. 34 2 Justice Powell stated:
It is not the responsibility-or indeed even the right-of this Court to
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the
legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that are "constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people."... Legislatures also are better qualified to weigh and "evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and
with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
343
courts."

Justice Powell confused the issues and the evidence in this statement. McCleskey's evidence did not suggest that capital punishment was inappropriate for the crime of murder. McCleskey's
evidence instead was directed at whether punishment was being administered fairly; the Baldus study indicates that fair administration
was not the practice in Georgia. The constitutional requirement of
the consistent and fair application of punishment was the heart of
the Furman decision. 34 4 The McCleskey Court abdicates its duty by
not adhering to the ideals set forth in Furman, resulting in the ignoring of the consequences of McCleskey's claims.
Furthermore, the Court has always taken an assertive role in
racial issues. The Court consistently has come to the rescue of ra340 See note 275 and accompanying text.
341 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 377, n.15 (1984).
342 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1781.
343 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
344 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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cial minorities, who are often both politically and economically impoverished. 3 45 Presently, society has formally repudiated racism.
Yet, racial bias still exists, and it is the Court's duty to eradicate this
evil to the best of its ability. If recognizing McCleskey's evidence
challenges other aspects of our criminal justice system, so be it.
This is a challenge that is constitutionally mandated to protect all
Americans equally, irrespective of race. Racism is not something
that can be eliminated by one decision; it is too deeply rooted in our
society. Nevertheless, every small step in that direction contributes
to a larger good that benefits all of society.
ANDERSON

E.

BYNAM

345 Perhaps the most famous example is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court struck down the segregation of public schools,
which at that time was a highly accepted practice.

